The extended mind hypothesis was
developed by Clark and Chalmers. The central argument of the hypothesis is that
cognitive processes assisted by entities external to an inidividual's mind
should equally be regarded as cognitive. If an external artefact is used to aid
a cognitive process or to expedite a process that can be completed mentally,
then that process, too, should be considered cognitive. For example, recording
information in a notebook could be considered a source of memory that is
external to the individual's physical 'mind'. Traditional accounts of cognition
are constrained by an a priori commitment to confining cognition within the
physical boundary of the individual. In this respect the extended mind
hypothesis is not particularly controversial, people very often use available
tools to offload cognitive work.
Where the hypothesis comes under
scrutiny is its treatment of cognitive processes. The hypothesis assumes an
understanding of cognition that is pre-existing and confirmed. Cognitive
processes are processes that are rely on cognition, whatever those might be. It
unclear as to where the original boundaries of cognition are drawn before the
authors set out to move the goalposts. Moreover, the extended mind hypothesis
is more a theory of extended cognition rather than a theory of an extended
mind.
A study by Sparrow, Liu and Wegner
goes some way in testing the proponents of this hypothesis. This study notes
that the development of internet search engines and databases provides easy
access to a wealth of information, a very extensive information store much like
the notebook mentioned in Clark and Chalmers. Participants were asked to read
and then type out a series of trivia statements. Half of the participants
operated under the impression that these statements would be stored on the
computer. The other half were told that the typed statements would be erased
upon completing the task. Both groups were then instructed to write down the
trivia statements they could recall. The ‘erased group’ demonstrated better
memory for the statements than those who were led to believe that they could
still access a record of the statements.
In a further experiment conducted
by the group, participants were shown a series of trivia statements which they
again read and typed out. Upon typing each statement participants were informed
that that statement had been saved in one of six named folders. Participants
were then given a recall task and asked to write down as many statements as
they could remember. Participants were also asked which folder a statement was
saved in using a keyword from the statement as a prompt.
The findings of this experiment
demonstrated that participants were more successful at remembering where
information was retained as opposed to the information itself. The authors
suggest that this implies that while the ‘what’ of information may be easily
forgotten that the ‘where’ can be retained. Sparrow, Liu and Wegner compare the
internet as a store of information to something akin to transactive memory, a
proposed means by which groups store and retrieve information. Transactive
memory is essentially a group mind whereby the knowledge of the whole is more
intricate and efficient than its individual components.
The proposal of the extended mind
hypothesis is more of a revaluation of cognition as opposed to the boundaries
of the mind. Its claims are difficult to assess experimentally but Sparrow, Liu and Wegner’s research has produced some interesting results. Potentially the
hypothesis could come to embrace transactive memory as a form of extended
cognition which would introduce an interesting social cognitive aspect to this
theory.
It appears we are having a hard time pinning down exactly what we mean when we speak of cognition, though whatever it is, it seems to entail some sort of overtly purposeful procedural element. When we speak of mind on the other hand we appear to be saying something about an occurrent state or experience, maybe even our feelings. Although at a certain level of description I can happily parse out these terms, I am not so confident that they are ultimately discriminable. With respect to the claim that the extended mind thesis as presented by C & C is more applicable to the idea of cognition, maybe you are right, but that this does not entail some consequence for the possible extension of 'mind' I am not so sure. A rather silly analogy comes to mind. Imagine a cooker enlisted with the job of steaming some broccoli. In order to do this efficiently the cooker must employ some extensions e.g. a pot, some sort of device for holding the broccoli, a lid for the pot and some water. If we see these extensions as aiding more effective steaming of the broccoli we must also recognise the fact that in order for any of this to make any sense at all we need heat. Heat permeates the whole system, and without it the system is inert, without it the system isn't a system at all really. In other words, mind is present in cognition. Mind is what makes cognition, maybe? If this is an argument for extended cognition, is it also an argument for extended mind?
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