Within cognitive science and philosophy of mind, poor
Descartes receives near-constant castigation over his doctrine of substance
dualism. Centuries of cultural and intellectual indoctrination with the ‘suppurating
wound’ of dualism are frequently held to blame for the fact that we find it
difficult not to split the mental and the physical into two separate metaphysical
categories. We are told that western thought was led astray by dualism,
essentially a philosophical formalisation of the old religious dogma of an immaterial
soul separable from a material body. But what if we humans are all actually
dualists to begin with?
This would seem to be what is suggested by developmental
psychologist Jesse Bering. Bering and Bjorklund’s experiment
involved showing a puppet show to a group of young children (from both secular
and religious backgrounds) in which an anthropomorphised mouse was eaten by an
alligator. The children were then asked questions about the mouse’s biological
and psychological functioning. The children understood that the mouse could no
longer eat, drink, sleep or perform any other obviously biological functions.
However, when asked whether the mouse was hungry, scared or thinking, most said
yes. Beyond this, in the realm of the psychological, children (and adult
controls) were more likely to attribute continued epistemic or emotional states
to the dead mouse than more obviously psychobiological ones (such as perceptual
states). The younger the children, the more likely they were to attribute
mental states to the mouse.
Bering interpreted this as supporting the idea that belief
in the continued existence of the mind after the death of the body (thus dualism)
was not the result of cultural indoctrination so much as a natural assumption
that comes to be undermined as one’s biological knowledge increases, or merely bolstered in some cases through exposure
to cultural indoctrination. That old favourite, Theory of Mind, just can’t be switched
off, even when the object of our socio-cogitation is a corpse. Before launching
into a trite dismissal, it must be said that Bering’s arguments on ‘the folk
psychology of souls’ have been elaborated to a far more complex degree than the
above suggests or than I can go into here; for a thorough account of his
position, see this article.
Obviously, what the theory needs more than anything is extensive cross-cultural
testing. Even the most secular western child grows up in an environment replete
with Christian-dualist trappings. Counter-evidence
to the idea of implicit dualism has indeed been provided by the anthropologist
Rita Astuti, who found that young children in Madagascar were more likely to
view death as total extinction than their elders were, suggesting a much more
central role for cultural indoctrination.
One thing worth mentioning, however, is that Bering
interprets his results as one of the possible supports for the culturally
near-universal phenomenon of afterlife beliefs. Traditionally, afterlife
beliefs have tended to be explained as a means of assuaging human death-angst,
but this has never really been that convincing an explanation given how truly abysmal,
unconsolling and terrifying many visions of the afterlife actually are (see this blog entry for some nice examples,
in particular the hereafter of Vanuatu, a place called Wies, home of ‘a being called Anrum Mbwilei, who was himself never
a living person. He stands in the centre of the village dancing ground in Wies
and beats the gongs. He beats them so hard that he excretes continually. His
excrement is the food of the dead…’ [Deacon, 1934])
So
perhaps we should extend a little mercy to the Father of Modern Philosophy and
not blame him entirely for the fact that dualism has been so difficult to shake off. It might just be built into the way
human beings think. I, for one, intend to be more merciful from here on in. I
don’t want to die and wake up in some version of Wies where I will be forced to
eat King Descartes’ excrement as punishment for disrespecting my Philosophical
Elders.
I think that a look at children and their "inherent dualist perspective" is a very fruitful area for research. Given that children often play games where someone can be "killed" (shot with a pretend gun)which then ends the game and forces a re-assignment of roles, the concept of bio-mechanical cessation and death aren't necessarily treated the same . Children seem to deal with it quite naturally though. Even when a character dies in a cartoon , children's brains don't explode when they see Mufasa walking around next time they watch "The Lion King". Dualism is very comforting. Perhaps it is a natural inclination in some respects.
ReplyDeleteThe concept of reincarnation in Buddhism and Hinduism does show an alternate arrival at dualism whereby the mind is always linked to a body (until Karma has been corrected). This image of a spirit freely flowing between animals is very vivid and unlikely to be conceived by children sporadically. Therefore I think culture will always play a huge role in the shaping of beliefs.
I'm sure you won't have to resort to eating Descartes excrement.
It is interesting that different individuals might be presented with exactly the same arguments for and against particular metaphysical stances, materialism vs dualism, say, and yet become vehemently opposed on the issue.
ReplyDeleteHugh's post reminds me of one attempt to deal with the existence of opposed, completely incompatible philosophical positions by recourse to psychological profiling, that attempted by David Berman: http://philosopedia.org/index.php/David_Berman
Descartes was a dualist because he is psychologically "disposed" toward that particular view of the world: he is a "type 2".
Likewise, the more materialist William James, according to the typology, might be described as a "type 1".
So, everyone may not be naturally dualist, as according to the post above, but individuals may be said to be innately predisposed to one stance or the other.
The merits or demerits of taking seriously any such typology may be up for debate, but the fact that it is possible to view the historically big philosophical questions, and suggest that the side of the debate you take is dictated rather arbitrarily by what "type" of person you are, certainly drives home the futility of any attempt to decide, in a principled way, between such stances.
Ah yes, I remember 'psychological philosophy' from my undergrad days in Trinners back when you were just a gleam in your mother's eye. Good to see little has changed. I'd say Dr. Berman would love this:
Deletehttp://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~ara/Manuscripts/Norenzayanetal%202012%20PLoS%20ONE.pdf